This paper comes in three parts. In the first part, I explore the question of the relation between the philosophies of the early and the later Wittgenstein as they are standardly distinguished, with the aim of raising some questions about whether that standard distinction might not obstruct our view of certain significant aspects of the development of Wittgenstein's thought. In the second part, drawing on the work of Marie McGinn and Warren Goldfarb, I distinguish two senses in which these two commentators have been moved to call upon the expression 'piecemeal' in their respective attempts to characterize an important feature of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method. In the third part, I draw upon this distinction to help bring into focus a significant shift in Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method which occurs fully within the so-called "later" period-a shift which has in no small part remained invisible due to the manner in which the opposition between an early and a later Wittgenstein has hitherto been conceived.
Marie McGinn and Warren Goldfarb, I distinguish two senses in which these two commentators have been moved to call upon the expression 'piecemeal' in their respective attempts to characterize an important feature of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method. In the third part, I draw upon this distinction to help bring into focus a significant shift in Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method which occurs fully within the so-called "later" period-a shift which has in no small part remained invisible due to the manner in which the opposition between an early and a later Wittgenstein has hitherto been conceived.
Norway, 1937 and the Question of Wittgenstein's Kehre
Interpreters of Heidegger like to refer to a particular moment in the development of that philosopher's thought as "die Kehre". In colloquial German the expression means "the reversal" or "the turning" (if one is describing a motion performed) or even "the about-face" or "the hairpin turn" (if one is focusing instead on the shape of the path traversed by such a motion). Heidegger scholars tend to see their philosopher's version of such a hairpin turn occurring shortly after he completed his early masterwork Being and Time. They accordingly divide his corpus of writings into two fundamental categories: those which came before and those which came after die Kehre. There is some disagreement among Heidegger scholars about when exactly to date the event, but it is often placed in or around the year 1929. Commentators on Wittgenstein's work do not similarly unite in employing a common expression to refer to the pivotal juncture which they find in their philosopher's thought, but the parallel is otherwise striking: this community of commentators is no less prone to construct a narrative which imposes on the development of their philosopher's thought an equally abrupt segmentation into an earlier and a later phase. They, too, accordingly divide the corpus of their philosopher's writings into two categories of texts-those that are said to have been composed by "the early Wittgenstein" and those that are said to be composed by "the later Wittgenstein". Moreover, they also locate his Kehre in or around the year 1929. Beginning in or around that year, a new philosopher ("the later Wittgenstein") is thought to have born and his primary mission in life is thought to have been that of prosecuting a merciless criticism of the ideas of the early Wittgenstein.
Once the habit of viewing a philosopher's work through the lens of such a radically bi-polar developmental narrative becomes thoroughly inculcated in a scholarly community, it tends to close off the possibility of a reader's so much as noticing forms of philosophical development from one text to the next which do not fit neatly into the entrenched narrative scheme. It thus becomes salutary, if possible, to loosen the grip of the scheme in question by considering and testing the plausibility of alternative developmental narratives. The simplest way to do this in the case of figures whose philosophical life stories have become tethered (as Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's have) to the organizing principle of a single epochal moment of Kehre is to uncover and spotlight equally decisive moments of discontinuity in their thought which are to be located substantially prior or subsequent to the supposedly epochal moment. One way to do this in the case of Wittgenstein would be to uncover a no less decisive development in his thought which occurred well before 1929, say, prior to his completion of the Tractatus.
1 Another would be to uncover a no less decisive development in his thought which occurred well after 1929, well after his initial return to the activity of regularly writing philosophy. This paper will attempt a version of the latter strategy. regardless of the precise terms in which one wants to account for the character of the philosophical shift in question, the period just before or during or shortly after 1929 must be the place to look if one wants to find the most significant shift in his conception of philosophy. With respect to questions pertaining to the development of at least the more fundamental aspects of his conception of philosophy, whatever happened in Norway in 1937, according to this narrative, must amount to something along the lines of a minor wrinkle. The following sort of wrinkle, for example, could be sanctioned and, indeed, is often advanced: During this period the later Wittgenstein turned his attention more closely to certain topics, thereby applying his already fully developed later conception of philosophy to hitherto comparatively unexplored philosophical issues, with the consequence that certain implications already latent in that conception (which he began to espouse in or around 1929) came to be further developed in connection with this or that particular philosophical topic.
A narrative along these lines, admittedly, still leaves lots of room for one to view what happened in Norway in 1937 to be of great consequence. Indeed, this would be an awkward thing to have to deny, in as much as it is there and then that
Wittgenstein completed the first fairly finished draft of the opening bit of the famous passages of the Philosophical Investigations now known as "the rule-following 2 For a helpful biographical account of this period of Wittgenstein's life, see Monk 1991. Goldfarb explaining the sense in which the Tractatus is committed to (to something one might want to call) "a piecemeal approach" to solving philosophical problems:
The lesson is that "nonsense" cannot really be a general term of criticism. As a general term of criticism, it would have to be legitimized by a theory of language, and Wittgenstein is insistent that there is no such thing. ("Logic must take care of itself.") … Wittgenstein's talk of nonsense just is shorthand for a process of coming to see how words fall apart when worked out from the inside. What Wittgenstein is urging is a case-by-case approach. The general rubric is nothing but synoptic for what emerges in each case. Here the commonality with his later thought is unmistakeable. (Goldfarb 1997, 71) The sense of 'piecemeal' that concerns McGinn -that is, the sense in which early Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems is anything but piecemeal -has to do with the unitary character of the method he employs, that is, with what makes it correct to speak of there being such a thing as the method of the Tractatus. The sense of 'piecemeal' that concerns Goldfarb -that is, the sense in which early Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems of necessity requires a case-bycase approach -has to do with the application of "the method of the Tractatus" to individual philosophical problems, and with why such an application must of necessity be retail, rather than wholesale.
Let us first explore this latter sense of the term, in accordance with which early Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method can properly be said to be piecemeal. This requires getting firmly into focus a critical difference between standard and (what have now become known as) resolute readings of the Tractatus.
According to standard readers, what the author of that work, in section 6.54, aims to call upon his reader to do (when he says that she will understand him when she reaches the point where she is able to recognize his sentences as nonsensical) is something that requires the reader of the work first to grasp and then to apply to the sentences of the work a theory that has been advanced in the body of the work. In order to be able to give content to the idea that we are able to come to grasp the commitments of such a theory, a commentator must hold that there is a fairly substantial sense in which we can come to "understand" the sentences that "explain" the theory, despite the fact we are eventually called upon to recognize these very same sentences as nonsense. Resolute readers are committed to rejecting such a reading.
Wittgenstein's declares that the kind of philosophy he seeks to practice in the Tractatus consists not in putting forward a theory, but rather in the exercise of a certain sort of activity -one of elucidation. A core commitment of a resolute reading lies in an insistence upon the thought that a proper understanding of the aim of the Tractatus depends upon taking Wittgenstein at his word here.
Peter Hacker is explicit about the fact that a standard reading of the Tractatus requires that one not take Wittgenstein at his word on this point:
To understand Wittgenstein's brief remarks about philosophy in the Tractatus, it is essential to realize that its practice and its theory are at odds with each other. The official de jure account of philosophy is wholly different from the de facto practice in the book. (Hacker 1986, 12) What would it be to take Wittgenstein's remarks about philosophy in the Tractatus at face value? According to resolute readers, to regard one of the sentences (of which the body of the book is comprised) to be a rung on the ladder (that we are asked to climb up and then throw away) is to take it to belong to this aspect of the task that the author of the work has set us. The reader reaches a moment in which she understands the author (and what he is doing with one of his sentences) each time she moves from a state of appearing to herself to be able to understand one of these sentences to a state in which it becomes evident to her that her earlier "state of understanding" was only apparent. This point is reached not through the reader's coming to be convinced by an argument that forces her to believe that such-and-such is the case, say, by convincing her that the sentence fails to meet certain necessary conditions on sense. (Why should she ever believe the conclusion of such an argument, if she takes herself still to be able to understand the sentence in question? As long as she is able to do this, doesn't she have good reason to question the premises of the argument?) Rather, the point is reached, in each case, by her experience of the sentence (and the sort of understanding it can seem to support) undergoing a transformation. Each such moment of "understanding the author" involves, in this sense, a change in the reader. Her sense of the world as a whole, at each such moment, waxes or wanes, not by her coming to see that p (for some effable or ineffable, propositional or quasi-propositional p), but rather by her coming to see that there is nothing of the form 'that _____' (of the sort she originally imagined) to believe. So a point of understanding the author is reached when she arrives at a moment in her relation to a given form of words when she is no longer able to sustain her original experience of "understanding the sentence". The task of thus overcoming each such particular appearance of sense (that each such rung on the ladder at first engenders in a reader) is an arduous one. The form of understanding that is at issue here for resolute readers can only be attained piecemeal, one set of sentences at a time.
Since they hold that the Tractatus has no general story about what makes something nonsense, resolute readers are obliged to hold that these moments of recognition that a reader is called upon (in section 6.54) to attain must come one step at a time, in the way that Goldfarb sketches in his account of the sense in which the Tractarian procedure of clarification is piecemeal. This is contrary to the spirit of most standard readings, according to which there can be a possible moment in a reader's assimilation of the doctrines of the book when the theory (once it has been fully digested by the reader) can be brought simultaneously to bear wholesale on all of the (putatively nonsensical) propositions that make up the work. According to such a reading of the Tractatus, once we have equipped ourselves with the right theory of language, we can determine where we have gone right and where we have gone wrong in philosophy, simply by applying the theory to each of the things we are drawn to say when speaking philosophically.
The foregoing distinction between two ways of uncovering of nonsense, retail and wholesale, has to be formulated carefully. 7 Otherwise it can easily lead to a distorted account of what is at issue between these two sorts of readers of the Tractatus. If one were to claim that one can uncover nonsense only one sentence at a 7 The following five paragraphs are indebted to comments by Cora Diamond on an earlier draft of this paper. They are meant to constitute a response to her worry that one mischaracterizes what is involved in early Wittgenstein's conception of the practice of philosophy (as being essentially piecemeal in the Goldfarb sense) if one characterizes the form of interrogation of sentences thereby required as being one which must necessarily proceed on a "sentence by sentence" basis. time according to resolute readers (with the unmasking of one sentence having no implications for one's view of any other), or, alternatively, if one were to claim that one can discover all of the (relevant) sentences of the Tractatus to be nonsense all at once according to standard readers (simply in virtue of having assimilated the correct theory of the limits of language, without having to do any further intellectual work), then, either way, one would have overstated matters. This way of putting the difference reduces it to a matter of the quantity of sentences which stand or fall through the exercise of a particular intellectual act: in the one case, only one sentence at a time; in the other case, a whole class of sentences at once. The opposition between the procedure of the piecemeal interrogation of sentences and that of the wholesale unmasking of sentences respectively envisaged by each of these sorts of readings is not properly framed through any such recourse to a merely quantitative unit of measure. What is true is that the resulting process of uncovering nonsense according to a resolute reader will be a far more arduous and gradual matter than it will be for a standard reader; but that is merely a secondary consequence of their real and deeper ground of difference. For the fundamental difference between these two readings, lies not in their respective understandings of the quantity of exercises of the requisite intellectual capacity but rather in their respective understandings of the qualitative nature of the capacity thus exercised.
For a standard reader, once a reader has fully grasped the theory advanced within the body of the work, the application of the theory to individual strings of words is essentially a mechanical matter, requiring only an inspection of the string in question in order to see if it accords with the dictates of the theory. Such an exercise of inspection, as standardly envisaged, requires neither any real imaginative effort nor any probing of the manner in which a particular speaker seeks to call upon the forms of words in question. This does not mean that in a single glance the devotee of such a theory will be able to take in that every nonsensical string is, indeed, nonsensical prior to having to inspect the strings in question. Such a discovery will take time and will require the examination of a great many individual linguistic strings. The verdict to be passed on each such string can, nonetheless, be said to be foreordained in the sense that it is a straightforward consequence of the theory. What is and what is not nonsense is a matter which has already been determined by the theory. What remains to be done, once the theory has been grasped, is simply the police work of applying its law and handing down its verdicts of guilt where appropriate. The subject, in each case, on whom such a verdict is passed is, in the first instance, the linguistic string itself. According to the standard reading, it is the linguistic strings themselves which are nonsense. The guilt of the speakers of such sentences is in this respect derivative:
it is to be traced to their proclivity to call upon the services of such linguistic strings while philosophizing.
For a resolute reader, the envisaged method of clarification requires attempting to discover whether it is possible to discern a symbol in the sign a manner which accords with the sort of (apparent) use to which a particular interlocutor wishes to put the sign in question. This of necessity requires both imaginative effort and a careful investigation into the manner in which the propositional signs in question admit of construal as propositional symbols. For a resolute reader, the charge of nonsense is directed not at the propositional sign itself, but rather at in the character of the relation in which a particular speaker stands to a propositional sign. This does mean, however, that for resolute readers nonsense can only be revealed a sentence at a time. A discovery that certain forms of words are nonsense (i.e., that certain propositional signs to which one believed that one had attached a sense had not yet been given a sense) is a form of discovery which will tend to have a cascading effect, altering one's view of the standing of a great many other forms of words to which one was also previously attracted (revealing them, too, to be propositional signs upon which one had not yet conferred a method of symbolizing though one believed one had already done so). As a reader internalizes the lessons of the Tractatus, learning to employ its notational instruments for interrogating sentences, she will naturally encounter moments in which the sense of a whole family of cases of sentences will therefore come to impugned together.
To take one example, such a reader may uncover a class of cases where there is a certain recurring kind of difference in symbol masked by a corresponding recurring kind of similarity of sign. She may then come to see that this whole family of cases (in which this sort of sign-symbol relation obtains) gives rise to a whole class of sentences which she had previously mistaken for sense. She can thereby come to see that constructions of this sort tend to conjure up for her a certain characteristic sort of illusion of sense. Once she sees through the manner in which this illusion is produced, the ensuing discovery can exert a pressure which ramifies throughout her relation to all sorts of related linguistic constructions. It is therefore perfectly open to a resolute reader to claim that the problems a reader uncovers in an especially clear example of a certain kind of sentence (one which exhibits a recurring characteristic sort of sign-symbol relation) are of such a sort that they can lead to the uncovering of nonsense in other cases: They can enable a reader of the work to come to see how the demands which she sought to place on a given sentence at one point in the text were also in play in the use to which she sought to put a great many other sentences elsewhere in the text. This means that the nature of the local awareness which a reader of the Tractatus is able to achieve of the incoherent nature of the demands she was prone to place on a particular sentence can be of such a sort that it can quite immediately lead to a more global awareness of the incoherent character of the demands which she is prone to place on a great many others. explore. The point of distinguishing the two different senses of 'piecemeal' above was to allow us to isolate and pose this question. 9 The presence of the definite article in the title of an earlier paper of mine, "The Method of the Tractatus" (a paper which, incidentally, argues for the piecemeal character of any application of the method to particular philosophical problems) was intended to mark just this moment of discontinuity in the philosophical conceptions of the early and can be made to fit within the confines of an article-length contribution to a volume of essays. I will therefore restrict myself here to an attempt to sketch the larger framework within which such an investigation would have to take place.
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I do think this much is clear: whenever exactly that break took place, it has been fully accomplished in the final version of Part I of Philosophical Investigations.
Of particular interest in this connection is the entire stretch in Philosophical
Investigations that runs from §89 to §133. In almost every remark we have some effort on Wittgenstein's part to bring his later methods of philosophy into relief by contrasting them with his earlier conception of the method (cf. §133) of philosophy, and yet numerous local moments of continuity surface within this overarching contrast. This contrast -between the (early) method and the (later) methods -draws many of the other points of difference between the early and later philosophies together and, in particular, the difference between the Tractatus's point of view on the problems of philosophy (according to which they have in essentials been solved) and the refusal of such a point of view in the Investigations (in which the essentials can no longer be separated in such a manner from the details of their treatment). The confidence expressed in the claim (in the Preface to the Tractatus) that the problems of philosophy have in essentials been solved is tied to a confidence that, at least in its 11 The only work of secondary literature on Wittgenstein known to me where such spade work is undertaken is by Joachim Schulte. He explores the topic of the relation between the respective conceptions of philosophical method to be found in the post-1929 and the post-1937 Wittgenstein in his 2002. He, too, draws attention there to a contrast between there being a philosophical method (according to the first of these Wittgensteins) and there being philosophical methods (according to the second) and goes on discuss how Wittgenstein rewrote a number of earlier passages in ways which reflect a preoccupation with his increasing awareness of the importance of such a contrast. essentials, the basic outline of the method for dissolving all such problems has been put been in place. (This, in turn, is tied to a confidence that there is something which is the logic of our language -the structure of which can be displayed in a perspicuous notation.) The Tractatus aims to furnish this basic outline and demonstrate its worth.
Once it has successfully done so, it is now to become clear, in retrospect, that the prior absence of a serviceable method had been the big problem for the early philosophy -for the solution to all other problems had depended on the solution to this one --and now that it has been resolved, they are in principle (if not yet in practice) also resolved. This central (apparent) achievement of the early philosophy, in turn, becomes a central target of the very late philosophy.
The entire stretch in Philosophical Investigations that runs from §89 to §133
can be read as seeking to expose the latent preconceptions that allowed early
Wittgenstein to imagine that he had done this -that he had been able to survey the structure of the problems as such and attain a perspective on them from which there could appear to be one big problem that could admit of an overarching form of solution (at least in its essentials). Yet, at the same time, there is still on his later conception much of local value in his early conception of clarification that is to be recovered within this fundamental break with the early conception. Hence, even in the course of this markedly critical sequence of reflections on the relation between the early and later conceptions of philosophical method, a crisscrossing method of investigation is required -one that denies nothing of value and recoups each of the gains of the early philosophy, while laboring to identify each of the moments in which it oversteps or overreaches. The tendency is to think that this question of "the extent of the continuity and the discontinuity in Wittgenstein's philosophy", here at issue in his critique of his earlier self in these passages, has primarily to do with the relation between the author of the Tractatus and the author of the Investigations. But I think this would be quite mistaken. I will return to the mistake in question in a moment.
I need first to digress briefly in order to introduce some terminology. It will help here if we are able to operate provisionally with an alternative narrative scheme-one which remains simple enough to allow us to command a reasonably clear overview of the relevant aspects of the developmental landscape, while introducing enough additional complexity to allow a dimension neglected on the standard depiction of that landscape to begin to come sharply into view. The ensuing exercise may seem to involve us in substituting for our original simplistic narrative scheme another only very slightly less simplistic one. But that need be the case only if we cease to keep track of the purpose for which the scheme is introduced in the first place. The purpose for which it is introduced here is as a contrasting object of comparison for the purpose of an exercise which seeks to illuminate certain limitations in the currently entrenched scheme.
In what follows, I will accordingly distinguish between an Chemistry successfully differentiated itself from the form it took in its infancy through having come to attain a condition in which the fundamental matters of controversy within the discipline were no longer ones of method. The mark of such a condition of maturity is that the practitioners of the discipline in question, at any given time, are properly able to rest content with a delimited number of antecedently fixed procedures for making progress within their field of inquiry. Both Early and Middle Wittgenstein sought, at least to this restricted degree, to usher in a sort of era of maturity for philosophy-an era in which philosophers would no longer need to wrangle with one another over questions of philosophical method.
It would be a mistake here to think that Middle Wittgenstein here thought that philosophy should aspire to imitate the method (or methods) of science. That would be a misunderstanding of how Wittgenstein viewed philosophy, early, middle, or late.
Wittgenstein could not be clearer in any number of passages about the extent to which he thinks it is a constant temptation (to which philosopher repeatedly succumb) as well as a fateful error (with numerous far-reaching consequences) for philosophers to attempt to model the method of philosophy at all closely on that of science. medicine has attained the form of a science characterized by a single uniform method 13 I am inclined to think that the less one knows about the real workings of science (and thus the less clear one is about what one means when speaking of "the method of a science"), the more one is apt to be able to go in for such a thought-experiment. (For a critique of such ideas of scientific method, see James Bryant Conant 1951.) I am therefore of the view that the thought-experiment here deployed is not merely fanciful, but actually involves a mistaken conception of the nature of science (and not merely of medical science). I do not think, however, that its ineliminable basis in fantasy need not detract from the capacity of the thought-experiment, to illuminate the point at issue here. It only means that a non-fantastic analogy which permitted one to make the same point would take considerably more care to construct and would, in all likelihood, be considerably more recherché . (It might involve, say, an elaboration of a moment in the history of a branch of mathematics in which a certain loosely related family of heuristics for solving an apparent motley of problems gave way, through the appropriate sort of discovery, to a general theory enabling one to identify all members of the family as problems of a common form.) but that it is has succeeded in fully analyzing the etiology of every possible form of human ailment and discovered a correlative form of successful treatment for each and every such ailment. In one sense of the term, in this fanciful future state, medicine has become a completed science of the possible forms of disease and their possible forms of cure. Having attained this state then, at least in one sense of the term, medicine has come to an end: There is no longer any reason to fund pure research in medicine. Yet even in this utopian state of completion (qua branch of scientific inquiry into the structure of the natural world), medicine qua craft of the diagnosis and treatment of individual ailments may well continue to involve the exercise of many of the very forms of phronesis currently possessed by the best physicians. Regardless of how systematic the pure science of medicine has become, the practice of the art of medicine may continue to remain piecemeal in the Goldfarb sense.
What makes this comparatively fanciful analogy more fitting for the purpose of this paper than the one drawn from the history of chemistry is the way in which it permits us to incorporate a parallel to the distinction between the two different dimensions along which one can enter a claim about the piecemeal character of Wittgenstein's method in philosophy. This allows us to accord the proper significance, in our handling of the analogy, to the complexity in the way in which these two dimensions then can be seen to come apart in the conceptions of method with which Early Wittgenstein and Middle Wittgenstein operate. For Early Wittgenstein, for example, the provision of a proper Begriffsschrift is the sort of thing which would, afford an inventory of all of the possible forms of philosophical confusion, and the tools for clarification it affords would provide a complete toolkit for the treatment of those forms of confusion. Yet its exhaustiveness in these respects would not eliminate the need for a form of elucidatory craft when it came to the clarification of individually felt philosophical problems.
Thus the author of the Tractatus can claim to have attained an overview of all of the forms of possible philosophical confusion while not needing to deny that the successful discernment of their proper modes of treatment remains a delicate matter.
The question as to which form or forms of treatment (which particular -or which particular combination of -forms of notation of the sort which the Tractatus introduces for the clarification of philosophical problems 14 ) ought be brought to bear and will prove genuinely of help with this or that felt confusion is one which may not admit of an easy answer-and, moreover, one which cannot be answered simply by surveying the structure of logical space. The answer to such a question requires entering oneself, at least provisionally, into the realm of confusion and allowing oneself to come to appreciate what it is like to experience this or that particular confusion from the inside -to allow oneself to imagine that a particular proposition occupies a position in logical space when it does not. 15 Early Wittgenstein is already of the view that such a form of discernment will require more than that one merely be armed with a perspicuous logical notation. respect still a piecemeal matter in the Goldfarb sense. For if one is suffering from a genuinely gripping philosophical perplexity then the application of these tools will, in all likelihood, yield forms relief and freedom from perplexity which can only come in turns and degrees, through a series of graduated steps over the course of a sustained elucidatory process, such that the overall procedure (which aims to make the problems completely disappear) might require considerable deftness, patience, and art on the part of its practitioner.
To employ a dangerous (because potentially misleading) analogy: just as even in the utopian world of the fanciful thought-experiment the discovery of all possible medical vaccines and cures for all possible forms of disease would not necessarily eliminate the art of medicine, since even the medical practitioner armed with a complete medical toolkit would still require experience, judgment and medical craft properly to diagnose, treat and, heal any particular form of illness (so that the true office of medicine to heal the sick must remain a forever piecemeal and unfinished task); so, too, for the author of the Tractatus, even after the method of philosophy has been discovered (and thus, in this sense, the problems have been in their essentials solved), still the work of philosophical elucidation -the true office of philosophymust remain a forever piecemeal and unfinished task (one which, with respect to its application in detail, must go on indefinitely without ever reaching a final resting place). The danger of this analogy lies in its comparison of a philosophical problem with an illness. 17 Like any analogy, it will be misunderstood if one construes it as involving an identification of the items on the left and right hand side of the analogy (philosophy and illness are the same thing) or a subsumption of the concept of the one item wholly under the concept of the other (philosophy is an illness).
The emphasis in the preceding paragraph is on the manner in which the conception of philosophical method already for Early Wittgenstein is piecemeal in the 20 Or, as he actually says: "First … if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in admit of a single overarching form of delimitation from within language. This was to have been effected through the provision of a perspicuous logical notation-one which is able to highlight the joints into which that manifold is articulated and through which it thus acquires its more determinate possible local forms of logical multiplicity. Early Wittgenstein's conception of the logic of our language gives way to Middle Wittgenstein's conception of grammars, where the emphasis on the plural now becomes essential to the conception. Starting in the middle period, an interest prevails in mapping the contours of alternative logical terrains which cannot be accommodated within a single space.
This transition from a definite article ("the" logic of our language) in Early it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on [the introduction of] limitations." (Kant 1963, 69) definite articles (the logic of our language) requires the correlative abandonment of the second of these definite articles (the method of philosophy The jest does help to underscore an important point which it is perhaps worth making as explicit as possible: It would be a misunderstanding of the relevant claim at issue here (regarding the manner in which Wittgenstein begins to rethink his views with regard to method during his sojourn in Norway) to take that claim to turn on the truth of any specific thesis regarding precisely when the first occurrence of the verbatim version of some particular remark to be found in the final version of the Philosophical Investigations happens to fall within a proposed timeframe-so that the entire proposal might be overturned simply by showing that some particular remark falls slightly outside that timeframe, say, with its first formulation coming as early as January 1936 or as late as sometime in 1938 or whatever. The claim in question has to do with a pattern of movement which is to be discerned in Wittgenstein's thought and is thus to be assessed through a careful investigation of the overall character of the manner in which Wittgenstein begins to revise his earlier remarks about the nature of philosophy-a process which, according to this claim, first begins to take on the aspect of a concerted and systematic revision of his earlier views during the period of the proposed timeframe. This means that one cannot assess the extent of the continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy simply by pointing to passages which happen to occur both at an earlier and a later point in his writing. What matters is whether the overall context in which those passages occur encourages and supports the same understanding of their significance. It is frequently the case that Wittgenstein continues to retain a sentence which purports to sum up some aspect of his thinking about a particular topic of philosophy while resituating it in a larger context which profoundly transforms its earlier significance. 22 The form of inquiry in which one 22 This is a point which can be demonstrated with respect to a great many of the sentences which continue to resurface in Wittgenstein's writing as we move from the early, through the middle, to the later period. I make such a case at more length in connection with the sentences which figure on what I call "the third list" in Conant 2007. must engage in order to assess the presence and the degree of a development in his thought with regard to a topic as fundamental as this one (namely, the topic: what is philosophy?) is thus necessarily exceedingly delicate and difficult.
I hope to have managed to say enough in the preceding pages to allow the reader at least simply to recognize that we here stand at the threshold of a broader inquiry. In order to see how the point just made about §133 represents only the tip of a larger iceberg of forms of revision in Wittgenstein's texts -forms of revision that themselves are symptomatic of a sea-change in his conception of philosophical method -what one would need to do is to investigate the detailed ways in which the entire stretch in Philosophical Investigations which runs from §89 to §133 involves a careful rewriting of the chapter on Philosophy in The Big Typescript. Such an investigation will reveal that that chapter was rewritten, bit by bit, in a manner which gradually began to purge it of its commitment to the idea that the method has been found once and for all (so that the problems of philosophy had been revealed to be of such a sort that the essentials of their solution allowed for a sort of discovery which could be separated from the messy details of their treatment). This meant purging many individual passages of his writing of the manner in which they were stamped by Middle Wittgenstein's continuing aspiration to be able to find a way to put philosophy on an absolutely solid footing -a footing which would leave much work for subsequent individual practitioners of the subject to do while, nonetheless, having altered the internal character of philosophy forever. On Later Wittgenstein's conception, the treatment of philosophical problems can no longer be separated in this way from a continuing exploration of the fundamental character of philosophy itself -which is to say that philosophy can never lose its nimbus while remaining philosophy. The forms of creativity required for the discovery of fruitful methods in philosophy and the forms of creativity required for the fruitful application of such methods to particular problems of philosophy are recognized by Later Wittgenstein as two aspects of a single task, each of which requires an unending cultivation of the other. This means that the most that philosophy can hope to achieve is to bring us moments of peace-moments in which we are able to break off philosophizing-because this or that philosophical perplexity has been made to completely disappear. For Later Wittgenstein, this means not only that the task of philosophical elucidation can never come to an end (as was already the case for Early Wittgenstein) because it is piecemeal in the Goldfarb sense, but also that we can never settle on a final and definitive answer to the question "What is philosophy? (as Early and Middle Wittgenstein both thought we could), for the task has come to be recognized as one which is piecemeal also in the McGinn sense.
A careful examination of the relevant differences between §89 to §133 of various aspects of that conception undergo over time. The suggestion which I have sought to render plausible in this paper is that a proper and careful charting of such a Kehre in Wittgenstein's "later" philosophy would constitute a difficult but worthwhile task-one which has been largely neglected, thereby allowing the significance of the corresponding shift in his conception of philosophy to go hitherto largely unnoticed. 24 
